Researchers at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government published the second annual edition of the Index of African Governance this week.  The index ranks the 48 sub-Saharan states based on their governments’ ability to produce particular “political goods.”  The researchers organized these political goods into five categories:  Safety and Security; Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and Human Development.

These five categories were then divided into 57 sub-categories.  The researchers assigned these sub-categories their relative weight after considering both the importance of the indicator and the robustness of the data.  The data compiled by the research team came from a variety of sources on a two-year time delay; the information used in this year’s index is from 2005 and 2006.  The team then summed the states’ sub-scores into aggregate scores to determine the ranking.

The ten top-performing states, in order and with their assigned score, are

1. Mauritius (85.1)
2. Seychelles (79.8)
3. Cape Verde (74.7)
4. Botswana (74.1)
5. South Africa (71.5)
6. Namibia (70.9)
7. Ghana (70.1)
8. Gabon (69.4)
9. Sao Tome and Principe (68.3)
10. Senegal (66.1)

The ten worst-performing states are

1. Somalia (18.9)
2. Democratic Republic of the Congo (29.8)
3. Chad (33.9)
4. Sudan (34.2)
5. Angola (43.3)
6. Central African Republic (43.6)
7. Cote d’Ivoire (45.6)
8. Eritrea (46.5)
9. Guinea (47.8)
10. Nigeria (48.5)

Three points:  First, the observation that a disproportionate number of the strongest states are small, island nations.  I can’t really speculate, but if I had to guess I would say this result has to do with the relative size of their populations and their relative distance from regional conflicts.  Then, of course, is the observation that the ten weakest states have been disproportionately involved in civil wars.

Second, the index’s most obvious weakness.  The time-delay in the collection of the data, for practical purposes, makes this ranking virtually irrelevant today.  Any insight the index gives to the region has been overwhelmingly superseded by developments in the region over the course of the last two years.  In its associated report, the research team lists all the developments the ranking fails to reflect:  “the recent massive deterioration in Zimbabwe’s security, rule of law, human rights record, economy, and human development… the troubles following the Kenyan election of 2007, the coups in Mauritania, the battles in the Comoros, the security enhancements in Uganda, the political shifts in South Africa, a flawed election in Nigeria, the continued hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and so on.”  The index is still relevant for academic purposes, but the project has consciously sacrificed timeliness for robust data.

Third, the index’s greatest strength.  The ranking’s focus on political goods intentionally broadens the traditional definition of “good governance.”  It places emphasis on outcomes, not effort, and thereby implies that only the results of policies are important, rather than the policies themselves.  The project also puts responsibility squarely on the shoulders of state governments, despite criticism that many of the indicators used in the rankings are affected by other factors.  Even while admitting that economic opportunity can be affected by resource endowments, and safety and security can be heavily influenced by third parties, the research team insists that governments must take control rather than assign blame.  In doing so, the project demands accountability and recognizes these governments’ capacity to affect positive change.  Assigning each state a score further helps track their progress in absolute terms, rather than simply their progress relative to the other states in the ranking.

The full rankings are here [pdf].