So, of course, the great question of the week: Did Mike Shanahan make the right call? (Or, if you are a Chargers fan, perhaps the question is did Ed Hochuli make the right call?)

Reviving memories of Boise State-Oklahoma (still the greatest game of anything I have ever seen), the Broncos ignored the conventional wisdom and played for the win on Sunday, going for 2 when down only 1 with less than 30 seconds to play, thereby causing the entire game to come down to one play.

Now, this is exactly the sort of thing that makes a lot of people really uneasy. I’m not sure why, but for most of the coaches and even sportswriters around the NFL are extremely orthodox in their understanding of when to go for two, and when not to. In this situation, becuase a simple extra point would provide a tie game that was almost certain to go into overtime, the convential wisdom would suggest that, especially at home, you take your chances with a coin flip and play it safe.

Is going for one really playing it safe, however?

Safe, to me, implies that the odds for victory are higher. And I’m not sure that’s the case for any team in Denver’s shoes– and especially for the Broncos on Sunday, considering the first 3 and 29/30 quarters of the first game.

For starters, the odds of making any given two-point conversion in the past few years has been right around 50%. I believe last year it was something around 49.5%, which, for all intents and purposes, might as well mean that any team that goes for it in this situation has a 50-50 shot at winning. Ironically, excatly the same odds of winning the OT coin toss.

But it’s not quite that simple. First off, in Sunday’s game, there was still time left on the clock– about 29 seconds, I think. Now this is not terribly significant, but it does mean that, should the Broncos miss their two point try, they can still attempt an onside kick and try a long field goal, a possiblity that pushes the odds of victory in favor of the bold team.

More importantly, as the NY Times, not normally known for its sportswriting, points out that going for two could potentially put one’s strongest feature, one’s offence, against the opponent’s weaker, defense. In this scenario, it makes perfect sense to go for two, because now the game is being decided precisely in the area in which you have the biggest edge.

Watching the game on Sunday, this argument is certainly applicable. Denver had been moving the ball well all game, and with San Diego’s return game looking so strong, it made little sense to let San Diego have one more chance to let Darren Sproles loose.

So, perhaps, going for two was, in reality, the safe, albeit unorthodox, decision. Why is that NFL teams cannot figure this out? Why are teams willing to blitz 8 players, run double-reverses, kick on side at strange places, but almost never go for two late in the game to take the lead? I don’t understand…

I am tempted to turn this in a new direction: ranting about teams going for it on fourth and 2 or less, but I think I’ll save that for another post, when the Jets get me really riled up. I think the Mets are doing a good enough job of that already…